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ON DISARMAMENT

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OF MICHIGAN

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 7 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

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DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. DEAN

(United States of America)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. E. PEPICH

Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU

Mr. M. HAMID

Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

Mr. G.D. COMAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Mr. H. BLIX
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSCOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. El-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. B.T. PRICE

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLÉ

Mr. D. MARK

Mr. S.H. McINTYRE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the thirty-second meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): It has been agreed by our two co-Chairmen that there should be discussion in plenary meeting this morning on the work of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. I should like to make some remarks on behalf of the United Kingdom.

All delegations have before them, of course, the verbatim records of the two meetings which have been held by the Sub-Committee since nuclear affairs were last discussed in plenary meeting -- that is to say, of the eleventh and twelfth meetings of the Sub-Committee -- ; but I think that the delegations of the nuclear Powers owe it to the other delegations, and in particular to the delegations which were the authors of the eight-Power memorandum, to give them the fullest account we can of the state of the Sub-Committee's discussions, and to fill out the cold print of the verbatim records by talking over with them round this table the difficulties as we see them, and the possibilities of overcoming these difficulties that we want to explore. That is what my delegation wishes to do.

The authors of the eight-Power memorandum /ENDC/28/ have already given proof of their willingness to help, and we want to continue to avail ourselves of that help. Let me first recall the twenty-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference on 26 April. My colleagues will remember that at that meeting, which was held on the occasion of the resumption of nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere over the Pacific, a number of representatives, while deeply regretting that resumption, expressed their hope that renewed efforts would be made in the Sub-Committee to reach agreement on a test ban.

The representative of the United Arab Republic, for example, said that his Government had had high hopes that the eight-Power memorandum might help to spare the world all the implications that the resumption of nuclear tests might induce. He went on to say that, if the endeavours of the United Arab Republic had not so far been successful, its

"efforts will go on ceaselessly with all the zeal, ingenuity and diligence at our command". (ENDC/PV.28, page 13)

The representative of Sweden quoted a statement by the Swedish Prime Minister which said that the Swedish Government

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"still deems it desirable that the Conference at Geneva continue the efforts enjoined upon it by the General Assembly of the United Nations to find an acceptable basis for an agreement on the abolition of nuclear weapon tests as one of the first steps on the road to disarmament."

(ibid., page 24)

The representative of Canada said:

"It is the view of the Canadian delegation that the possibilities for compromise which the initiative of the eight non-aligned Powers offers have not yet been fully explored, and we hope that this work will be resumed at an appropriate time by the Sub-Committee of the nuclear Powers and brought to a successful conclusion." (ibid., page 37)

Finally -- and, we thought at the time, most significantly -- the representative of the Soviet Union said that the Soviet Union

"will wage an even more resolute struggle for general and complete disarmament and for the ending of the nuclear armaments race."

(ibid., page 10)

It was against the background of these statements that the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests met on the same day for its eleventh meeting. In his intervention at that meeting Mr. Gouber recalled what had been said at the morning's plenary meeting. He said:

"... as I saw it, one common thread ran through the speeches this morning, the common thread that we must not only continue but redouble our efforts, both here and in plenary Conference, to reach agreement. Indeed, I am fortified in that because I recall that Mr. Zorin himself made that statement ... So we come back here today with a renewed sense of urgency in our desire to make progress. That is what will condition my approach".

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.11, page 12)

Indeed, this is what has conditioned the approach of the two Western delegations in the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests, as I think will be obvious to any reader of the verbatim records. Both the United States and the United Kingdom delegations not only have accepted the eight-Power memorandum as a basis of discussion but have in the nuclear Sub-Committee been trying to make a beginning in the task of constructive negotiation upon it. I emphasize the word "negotiation". The representative of the United States, Mr. Deal, said in the course of the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee on 3 May:

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"I have listened with great interest to what our Soviet colleague has had to say this afternoon. We shall certainly give his statement our most serious attention because we want to explore with him most carefully the eight-Power memorandum, which offers a basis for fruitful negotiations." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.12, page 6)

There are three principal elements in the suggestions put forward in the eight-Power memorandum. First, there is the question of a detection system. This is dealt with in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the memorandum. Second, there is the question of an international scientific commission. This is dealt with in paragraph 4 of the memorandum. Third, there is the question of clarification or identification, including that of on-site inspection. This is dealt with in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum.

The United States and the United Kingdom have been trying to open up constructive discussions on each one of these three elements -- I repeat, on each one of these three elements. If the Conference will bear with me, I will go into somewhat fuller detail in the case of each of the three elements.

First, I shall deal with the detection system. I would here invite the attention of the Committee to Mr. Dean's remarks at the eleventh meeting of the Sub-Committee on 26 April:

"... at our Sub-Committee meeting on 24 April I attempted to set forth the views of my delegation on the new prospects for a nuclear test ban agreement which we find contained in the joint memorandum. I indicated that my delegation would not give up its position that control arrangements must be scientifically adequate and must provide objective assurance of uncovering at least some treaty violations, if any take place.

"At the same time, I made it clear that we were not ruling out changes from past positions. For example, just on the question of national stations versus an international network of control posts, I said that

"It may well be scientifically and administratively possible to construct, on the basis of the systems existing in many countries of the world, an international, supplemented or integrated control post network which will give the necessary degree of assurance and which, through mechanical, technical and other safeguards, will also provide reliable, scientific and trustworthy data. We are willing to examine this question. (ENDC/SC.I/PV.10, page 15)

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

"Indeed we are. In other words, it is precisely on matters such as this that we see possible elements of compromise." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.11, page 5.)

On behalf of the United Kingdom, I endorse fully what Mr. Dean said, and I shall add some observations of my own. In the eight-Power memorandum the question of detection is not dealt with in vacuo. The memorandum speaks in paragraph 3 of "a system" and in paragraph 4 of "the system". Now the memorandum cannot possibly be referring in those words to the system of any one country alone. It cannot be referring simply to the national system of the Soviet Union, or the national system of the United States, or the national system of Sweden. It is presumably speaking of a single system internationally organized. The memorandum links such a system with the concept of an international commission which, in the words of paragraph 4 of the memorandum, "should be entrusted with the tasks of processing all data received from the agreed system of observation posts ..."

This is a concept with which the United Kingdom is in broad agreement. We agree with Mr. Dean that in the detailed working out of the concept there are opportunities for constructive compromise. If such a system is to work effectively, then it is in our view so desirable as to be virtually essential that the various individual detection posts, whether national or international, whether existing or new, should operate on a standardized or unified international basis. At the very least, all the instruments at individual posts should share a common standard of the most up-to-date equipment available and should have common standards of measurement, accuracy, reliability and reporting. What these standards should be; what guarantees there should be that they are observed; to what extent there should be posts or systems operated by the international commission; to what extent some or all stations should be wholly or partly manned by staff of the international commission, if only to ensure that common standards are in fact maintained -- all this is a field for exploration and negotiation. I have purposely, deliberately, been using alternative words and phrases in order to illustrate what a wide field for exploration, and I would hope for an agreed compromise, appears to me to exist.

Indeed, in the words I have just used I have not merely been renewing our invitation to the Soviet representative, an invitation already extended to him in at least three meetings of the Sub-Committee, to join in negotiation with us on these points. I am going further than that. I am actually by my choice of words continuing, on my side, the process of negotiation. But negotiation is like courtship: it takes two parties.

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Now I would turn to the second element, the international commission. Having tried to open up for negotiation at the Sub-Committee's tenth and eleventh meetings the question of the detection system, Mr. Dean, at the twelfth meeting, undertook a careful and fully considered examination of the principle of the establishment of an international commission, as provided for in the eight-Power memorandum, and of the problems which would inevitably arise therefrom. An examination of his remarks in the verbatim record will show that here too the United States is flexible in its approach, and I take this opportunity fully to associate myself with what Mr. Dean said. In particular I would draw attention to the following passage from his remarks:

"Nevertheless, I do not wish to imply at all that the United States delegation has in mind the establishment of a central headquarters organization which would be the same in all respects as the headquarters scheme which is included in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty of 18 April 1961 and which, in turn, was the product of much negotiation between the Soviet and Western delegations. On the contrary, we believe that the future headquarters might well be a good deal simpler than was planned under the previous organization plan." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.12, page 10)

Mr. Dean concluded:

"To the extent that national stations were used there would be a reduction in the work --- Construction problems would also be simplified ... I presume the procedures for regular aircraft sampling could be undertaken on a national basis, which would by itself considerably reduce the commission's burdens.

"All these changes should result in a noticeable reduction of both capital and annual headquarters costs, and should permit more flexibility and a somewhat reduced scale of headquarters activities. The full extent of these changes can become apparent only as we work out other details of the treaty. But there is no doubt that the final product would differ in many ways from past plans for system headquarters." (ibid., page 11)

That statement made by Mr. Dean was a reasoned and forcible invitation to the Soviet Union to join in negotiating on one of the most important provisions of the eight-Power memorandum. It constituted a major effort on the part of one of the Western delegations to make progress in the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. It has the full support of my delegation.

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I now turn to the third element in the eight-Power memorandum, namely identification and verification, including on-site inspection. I want once more to state clearly and simply the United Kingdom attitude on this point. It has already been explained both by Lord Home and by Mr. Godber. Let me express it again. It is that the Western position over international inspection is already, and has been since April 1961, and indeed earlier, a compromise between two extremes, and a generous compromise. The one extreme, the one pole, is the proposal of the 1958 experts, which Mr. Tsarephkin himself joined in framing, that every unidentified event which might be suspected of being a clandestine nuclear explosion should be liable to inspection. The other extreme, the other pole, is the proposal of the Soviet Union, put forward on 23 November 1961, that no unidentified or suspicious event should be liable to international inspection.

We are not going back to or standing upon the 1958 position, the extreme at one end of the scale. The Western position, as I have said, has long been a compromise between these two extremes. We are asking the Soviet Union to retreat from its extreme position at the other end of the scale. A reasonable and fair compromise would have been that 5 per cent of such events should be inspected. This would have been a straight compromise. But the West has moved even far beyond that and has asked for only one in four or one in five of such events to be inspected.

I repeat: We do not propose to go back to the 1958 position of inspection of all such events. No, we are not asking the Soviet Government to agree to that, or even to accept a compromise on a 50-50 basis. In our desire for an agreement we are leaning forward much further than that to meet the Soviet Union. On the other hand, we do not accept the extreme Soviet position that there should be no obligation of international inspection in the case of any unidentified or suspicious event. On this point we are in favour of a compromise; and our understanding of the motives of the sponsors of the eight-Power memorandum is that this has been put forward by them to facilitate a compromise and not for the maintenance of extreme positions. If we had ever thought that it represented an extreme position, our approach to it would no doubt have been different. That, however, is not how we understand it. Our difficulty is with the Soviet Government. Our difficulty is that we are by no means sure what the Soviet Government, in accepting the memorandum as a basis for discussion, is saying on the all-important problem of on-site inspection, the key problem for the resolution of our difficulties.

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As may be seen from the verbatim records, Mr. Godber has on numerous occasions asked of our Soviet colleagues a simple question. The question was whether, in accepting the joint memorandum, the Soviet Union accepted and was willing to implement the clear implication of the need for on-site inspection in certain cases -- not in all cases, not in every case, but in certain cases -- not as just a possibility, as something which may happen or may never happen, but as an obligation; whether the Soviet Union was willing to accept the obligation of some international on-site inspection, just as the West is willing on its side to accept this obligation.

At the twelfth meeting of the nuclear test Sub-Committee Mr. Godber quoted a recent statement of the Prime Minister of Japan in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev. In that letter, of 20 April of this year, Mr. Ikeda wrote to Chairman Khrushchev as follows:

"Your claim that international control means international spying is absolutely unacceptable to me. Inasmuch as international control is to be exercised equally upon all nations, it is inconceivable that your country alone would unilaterally suffer any disadvantage."

(ENDC/SC.1/PV.12, page 15)

I repeat that the Western countries are willing to accept such an obligation. It seems a small sacrifice -- a small sacrifice -- for the sake of freeing mankind for ever from nuclear testing. We have put the question again and again to Soviet representatives and have had the utmost difficulty on obtaining a clear answer. At the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee, however, Mr. Tsarapkin put an interpretation on certain aspects of the memorandum which makes us fear that the Soviet Union has not moved from the basic position which it adopted on 28 November of last year. I am referring to the following statement made at the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee:

"Our negotiations will not emerge from deadlock and make progress until the Western Powers accept by deeds as well as words the proposals of the eight non-aligned countries as they appear in the memorandum.

In this memorandum -- its most important passage -- the eight States propose that control over the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests should be organized with the aid of national observation systems. That is the first point. The second is that the eight non-aligned States propose that inspection should be made by invitation of States parties to the treaty, not at the instance or by order of the international commission."

(ENDC/SC.1/PV.12, page 13)

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Mr. Tsarapkin's words on that occasion lead us to fear that the Soviet Union is in fact refusing to accept any departure from the two basic points in the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1961. At least, the Soviet interpretation of the eight-Power memorandum appears to coincide very closely with the Soviet views of November last on the two points, first, of reliance on national systems of detection only, and secondly, of the absence of any obligation to admit even a minimum of international on-site inspection.

I sincerely hope that our fears are groundless and that Mr. Tsarapkin or Mr. Zorin will tell us so. We, for our part, do not see how a compromise proposal or a compromise agreement could be founded upon the extreme Soviet position of exclusive reliance on unco-ordinated national detection systems and on the absence of any obligation to accept a minimum of international inspection. Certainly such an agreement would not be a compromise.

I have dwelt -- I hope at not too great length -- on the three elements in the eight-Power memorandum. On the first element, the detection system, we have tried and are still trying to open up compromise negotiations, but I am sorry to say that Mr. Dean's efforts at the eleventh meeting of the Sub-Committee have so far -- I hope it is only so far -- met with no response. At that meeting Mr. Tsarapkin confined himself, as my colleagues will see from the verbatim record, to making a repetitive propaganda attack on the United States and the United Kingdom, an intervention which was purely negative. Equally, our efforts at the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee to open up the question of the international commission have not so far elicited any sympathetic response from our Soviet colleague -- again I say I hope it is only so far. Finally, on the question of international inspection we still await the assurance from the Soviet representative that his Government is not adhering to its extreme position of no obligation to accept any international inspection at all.

Indeed, the Soviet representative has not so far clarified the following remarks which he made at the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee:

"We are compelled to point out, with great regret, that our Conference -- that is, this Sub-Committee -- is in the same deadlock as the three-Power Conference that terminated at the end of January at the instance of the Western Powers. The present deadlock is also the work of the Western Powers, which cling to their old attitude towards the

control system and inspection. In view of the Western Powers' position, there does not seem to be the slightest prospect of agreement here in the Sub-Committee." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.12, page 6)

I find that statement both depressing and, in the light of what I have said of the Western attitude, incomprehensible. I just do not understand. None the less, I do not want to end on a note of despair. I do not believe that the Soviet representatives really wish to brush on one side the words of the co-sponsors of the eight-Power memorandum which tell us most emphatically that the memorandum is not intended by them as a blueprint for a treaty but is meant to stimulate negotiation between the three nuclear Powers. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned we intend, like King Bruce and the spider, to keep on trying.

Perhaps I may end on this question of perseverance by recalling a story which most of us, I expect, know in our childhood. There was a farmer's wife who accidentally left outside a thick bowl of rich cream. Two frogs fell into the bowl. They swam around the bowl and they saw there was no way out. The first frog floated to the top, turned on his back and drowned. The second frog said, "I am going to persevere in trying to find a way out of this sticky mess as long as I have a kick left in my body". He went on kicking, and just as he reached the last kick of his strength he found himself sitting on a solid pat of butter.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should now like to make a statement in my capacity as Chairman of the United States delegation.

Ten days have passed since we last discussed at a plenary meeting of this Conference the question of concluding an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. During that time there have been only two meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee, not because of any known lack of readiness by the three members of the Sub-Committee to discuss the question, but because of the two-day holiday last week and the meetings held by the two co-Chairmen on the afternoon of 2 May and 4 May. We anticipate that the Sub-Committee will meet somewhat more often this week and from this time forth in order to press ahead as rapidly as possible on this important subject.

There have now been three Sub-Committee meetings altogether -- that is, numbers 10, 11 and 12 -- since consideration was begun of the possibilities for agreement which, we hope may exist in the proposals put forward by the eight delegations which co-sponsored the joint memorandum (ENDC/28) of 16 April. In

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other words, the three nuclear Powers have been attempting to determine what sort of mutually-acceptable arrangements might be devised in regard to a nuclear test ban treaty if we assume, for present purposes, that the eight-nation plan will be a basis or one of the bases for negotiations.

The United States and United Kingdom delegations in the Sub-Committee have attempted to catalogue the various separate topics and factors which must inevitably be taken into account in working out any control arrangements under a workable test ban. We have sought to suggest how these various items might be rearranged so that the result would be compatible with the suggestions of the eight co-sponsors.

In particular, the Western representatives have reviewed in detail the way in which matters might be worked out in a businesslike way, both on the issue of determining the true nature of unidentified events, including the use of on-site inspections, and on the issue of establishing some sort of impartial central scientific organ or institution to draw together and co-ordinate whatever future control machinery may be agreed upon.

The Soviet delegation devoted one of the meetings of the Sub-Committee, the eleventh, to a general attack upon the United States position on nuclear testing and on a test ban. This somewhat polemical statement paralleled what Mr. Zorin had said on these matters at the twenty-eight plenary meeting the day before.

In regard to the other two Sub-Committee meetings, Mr. Tsarapkin used one of them, the tenth, to present the Soviet view of how arrangements might be worked out under a test ban treaty following the eight-nation plan. His remarks at the twelfth meeting consisted only of a rejection of the Western understanding of how on-site inspection would be initiated within the meaning of the joint memorandum, and of an accusation that the Western Powers were not attempting to negotiate sincerely on the basis of the joint memorandum.

I think it will be worth our while to examine these two matters more closely to see how a nuclear test ban treaty might work.

The Soviet delegation has not in fact -- so far at least -- given any details of its ideas about implementing the eight-nation plan. Rather it has contented itself with a few very broad generalizations about future operations.

At the tenth Sub-Committee meeting Mr. Tsarapkin paid lip service to the idea that the eight-nation proposal was intended to be a compromise between the previous positions of the Soviet Union and the West. However, the terms in which he expounded the compromise provisions -- or, rather, the extreme Soviet interpretation which he put on the joint memorandum -- made the outcome look almost identical with the proposals of 28 November 1961 advanced by the Soviet Union.

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For example, the Western delegations were told that the basic foundation of the test ban control system would be the exploitation of "existing national posts". To this Mr. Tsarapkin added that additional observation posts could be created by agreement, but he offered no ideas on the possible number of posts, where they might be located, how they might supplement national stations, how they would be staffed, how national and international stations might be interrelated, whether the international stations would be operated by the international commission or by national authorities, or who would arrange for their construction. In other words, the only concrete information that we were given by the Soviet representative was that control would rest on national systems, as indeed the Soviet Union has been insisting for the last six months. Everything else which might involve any genuine move towards the Western position was left undefined. Indeed, more than that, any new stations that might be built were made subject to Soviet agreement or acquiescence rather than to a decision of the proposed international commission.

Regarding an international control organ, the Western delegations were informed by their Soviet colleagues that the USSR now agreed to creating an international scientific commission. In fact, the same words were used as are contained on this point in paragraph 4 of the joint memorandum. However, this was hardly enlightening, because the eight-Power plan is itself somewhat sketchy in this field and leaves almost everything to be worked out by the nuclear States, which is what we are trying to do.

From the few hints that were offered by Mr. Tsarapkin, the Soviet delegation envisages the scientific commission to be purely a data-processing body which will undertake certain consultations with the parties to the treaty on certain occasions and which will publish conclusions about the nature of suspicious events. This, of course, leaves it totally unclear whether the international scientific commission is to have any real co-ordinating or supervisory functions over the network of data-recording stations, whether national or not; how the commission is to be constituted; to which authority it is to be responsible; and what is to be the nature and the functions of its staff.

Even greater uncertainties arise from the Soviet delegation's exposition of what is to take place in regard to on-site inspection. All we know from Mr. Tsarapkin is that the Soviet Union considers that the theoretical possibility of conducting on-site inspections is a major compromise element in the eight-nation plan. However, the Soviet delegation also says that no on-site inspections

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will take place unless the government of the country to be inspected invites the international commission to carry out the inspection. In our view this does not differ in any essential respect from the previous position of the Soviet Union that on-site inspections on Soviet territory are unnecessary and must not be allowed except when, how and where the Soviet Union wishes.

The Western delegations have also been unsuccessful in getting the Soviet delegation to state whether it would ever issue an invitation for an on-site inspection; the United Kingdom representative has already made this point. This is indeed a serious matter, because we know that Premier Khrushchev, in his letter of 12 April 1962 to Prime Minister Macmillan ENDC/277, said that the USSR could not agree to on-site inspections in connexion with test ban controls. However, even if the Soviet Union said now that it might issue an invitation in the future, this would still not be of any significance as a measure of control, because it is quite apparent that no country would ever invite an inspection to take place in any instance where it had something to hide -- that is, if it had violated the treaty by conducting a secret nuclear test. It is all too apparent, I submit, that the Soviet delegation has done nothing substantial to make possible a realistic agreement based on the principles embodied in the eight-nation plan.

This is not merely a question of Soviet refusal to go into any of the details that would have to be considered in implementing the joint memorandum, important though this is in itself. The fundamental difficulty is that the Soviet Union has given its own interpretation to the joint memorandum, and then the Soviet Union insists that this is the only possible interpretation. It refuses to explore the memorandum realistically. In its view, therefore, there is really nothing to do except sign an agreement on the lines of its statement at the tenth meeting of the Sub-Committee, which the USSR arbitrarily and automatically claims to be the only valid interpretation of the intent of the eight co-sponsors. The coincidence that this Soviet interpretation turns out to be almost identical in any meaningful sense with what the Soviet Union has been advocating since 28 November 1961 is, in the eyes of the Soviet delegation, I suppose, merely a piece of good luck. Nevertheless this is all that we are offered.

It is abundantly clear to the United States delegation that this picture bears no relation to the reality of the problem confronting us in negotiating a workable and effective nuclear test ban treaty in which all of us can have confidence that testing will not in fact occur. That is what we want. We have

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been assured repeatedly by the various co-sponsoring delegations that their proposal in the joint memorandum was intended to be a compromise plan between the previous Western and Soviet positions. At the same time, I do not think that it has ever been suggested that the compromise was to be, as in the case of King Solomon and the baby, an exact mathematical division by two of the difference between the two sides so that the resulting treaty would follow a course absolutely in the middle.

In fact, even if there were a desire to do so, I do not know how anyone could work out such an exact mathematical compromise on a subject like a test ban where the provisions of a treaty must be practical and are anything but mathematical. The compromise of which we have heard from the co-sponsors exists, not in any such abstract mathematical concept, but rather in the inter-related provisions of the document which they have presented to us. That document, the joint memorandum, refers to a number of the essential features of a possible compromise arrangement for verifying the fulfilment of test ban commitments. However, it stands to reason that the eight delegations were putting forward suggestions that were intended effectively to accomplish the purpose of control and that they were not at all trying to create purely fictitious control arrangements which would be totally meaningless in terms of deterring potential violations of a test ban treaty.

This view of the eight-nation proposal is indeed supported by our reading of its terms. Indeed, if this had not been the case my delegation would not have been able to inform the twenty-fifth plenary meeting that the United States was willing -- as indeed it is still willing -- to examine carefully and thoroughly the joint memorandum as one of the possible bases for concluding a test ban treaty.

The records of the eleventh and twelfth Sub-Committee meetings contain the detailed exposition which my delegation has made on how it should be possible to approach the task of working out arrangements on the basis of the eight-nation plan in regard to on-site inspections and to the central international control organ. We have not yet gone into a more detailed elaboration of the situation in regard to data-collecting posts than was given in our more general statement on this matter at the tenth Sub-Committee meeting. Any delegation which has reviewed the verbatim records will see that my delegation has been realistically discussing possible approaches to these questions which differ considerably from our previous position. In other words, we are far from being adamant.

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Of course we have not as yet committed ourselves to any of these new ideas, because they are being put forward in this very special context of exploring how we might work out control measures on the basis of the eight-nation plan. Once we have reviewed all of the various possibilities, and have a coherent and complete picture of how arrangements might turn out, then my Government will be in a position to see whether it can adopt such an approach as its fundamental policy.

However, we have not yet reached that stage, and I may say that we will not be able to get to that point unless and until the Soviet delegation begins to fill in the great number of blank spaces which abound in the eight-nation plan, which we have all been asked by the co-sponsors to explore. In this respect we have kept in the forefront of our thoughts the statement made at the twenty-fourth plenary meeting by Mr. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia, when he said of the joint memorandum:

"It is not a blueprint for a treaty. It is rather our considered effort to break the deadlock in the three-Power talks. This implies that vast areas in the picture have to be filled in by detailed negotiations on the basis suggested in the joint memorandum." (ENDC/PV.24, page 5)

My delegation is convinced that the view which we have taken of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the eight-nation plan in regard to on-site inspections is the only interpretation which both makes sense and accords with the known views of its sponsors. As I explained at the eleventh Sub-Committee meeting, we acknowledge full well that no obligation is imposed on any party to the treaty by paragraph 4 of the joint memorandum to permit an on-site inspection to take place on its territory. The aim of paragraph 4 of the memorandum is to ensure that the parties to the treaty are under some obligation to get the necessary facts in regard to geophysical events recorded by stations on its territory to the international scientific commission so that, as is hoped, the commission will be in a position to assess the nature of a suspicious event.

Generally speaking, the facts to which the memorandum is here referring, and which are to be forwarded, are those which any party to the treaty would obtain from the operation of its own national detection stations or of stations which may co-operate with it, and the eight-nation plan intends to ensure that such data are forwarded to the commission.

At the same time, paragraph 4 anticipates the situation in which a party will itself realize that data from control stations may be inadequate in some

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cases, and in which the party may therefore wish to take the initiative in requesting an on-site inspection. Such an inspection would take place by invitation, so that the circumstances surrounding that particular suspicious event would be clarified as much as possible, provided that the invitation were timely, that the inspection team were impartial, and that it were efficiently organized and not interfered with by the inviting country.

If this were all that the joint memorandum said on the subject of on-site inspections, then the Soviet delegation would be quite justified in its assertion that such inspections could occur only by invitation of the party to be inspected. To come to any such conclusion, however, would be to ignore paragraph 5 of the memorandum altogether.

Paragraph 5 brings up the general problem of what is to happen in those situations where the international scientific commission finds itself unable to assess the nature of a suspicious event on the basis of the data and facts which have become available to it. For such cases the joint memorandum stipulates a regular procedure for making it possible for the commission to carry out the primary duty imposed on it by the memorandum, namely, the duty of making an assessment of each suspicious event. Paragraph 5 stipulates that, when the commission finds itself unable to reach a conclusion about an event, it must consult with the party concerned. The object here, quite naturally, is to give the party an opportunity to help the commission in its task by suggesting that the commission may possibly have overlooked some important facts already available, or by indicating how the commission may have made an error in its analysis, or by furnishing additional data to the commission.

Nevertheless, paragraph 5 also envisages the situation in which the consultation between the party and the commission does not produce agreement either because of a genuine divergence of views, which is possible, or because the party may not be acting in good faith. In this case paragraph 5 specifies that, in accordance with the obligation noted in paragraph 4 -- that is, the obligation to furnish the commission with all the necessary facts -- any party would be committed to co-operate with the commission in facilitating the assessment.

We are all aware that certain facts can be obtained only through the on-site inspection processes, and in those instances where such facts were essential the parties' obligation to co-operate would necessarily include the obligation to permit an on-site inspection to obtain those facts. Naturally, we know that the

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international commission and its personnel could not physically force their way on to the territory of a party which was unwilling to co-operate in having the inspection carried out. However, in any such case of failure to live up to treaty commitments other parties could invoke their rights under the principle set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 5 of the joint memorandum, which reads:

"The parties to the treaty would be free to determine their action with regard to the treaty on the basis of reports furnished by the international commission." (ENDC/28)

This would mean that the other parties would certainly be free to abandon their obligation not to conduct nuclear weapon tests if one party had refused to allow an on-site inspection by the international commission.

At the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee Mr. Tsarapkin made a brief attempt to deny the validity of this interpretation. He claimed that:

"... paragraph 5 ... says that verification in loco must be carried out in accordance with the obligations referred to in paragraph 4 -- that is, on the invitation given in such cases by the party to the treaty."

(ENDC/SC.1/PV.12, page 4-5)

But, of course, paragraph 4 does not speak of any obligation to have on-site inspections at all: the only obligation of a party is to furnish the necessary facts about a suspicious and significant event to the international commission. As I have indicated previously, this obligation to furnish facts need not involve on-site inspections at all, unless the party wishes to invite the commission under paragraph 4, except in those cases under paragraph 5 where the on-site inspection is found to be the only means by which the necessary facts can be obtained by the international commission.

I am much fortified in this view of the intent of the eight co-sponsors about on-site inspections by a re-reading of some of the statements made by representatives of those eight nations at earlier plenary meetings of this Conference. For instance, at the thirteenth meeting -- which was two weeks before the submission of the joint memorandum -- the representative of Burma asked this question:

"Might not a less elaborate international system, perhaps omitting control posts from the territories of those who object to them, but with the right of conducting an agreed number of properly safeguarded on-site inspections by the international control organ, serve all our purposes just as well?"

(ENDC/PV.13, page 8)

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This general view of the outline which a compromise arrangement might involve was offered after an analysis of the test ban control system, in the course of which the Burmese representative had also stated that interpretations of data recorded by instruments could differ. He then asked:

"How would a difference of this kind be resolved unless there were in existence some impartial international scientific body acceptable to all the nuclear Powers whose function would be to settle such disputes, if necessary after making such enquiries and inspections as may be considered by it to be essential?" (ibid., page 7)

This concept indeed, I submit, shows a striking resemblance to the ideas incorporated in paragraph 5 of the joint memorandum.

Of course the representative of Burma was not alone among the eight co-sponsoring delegations in presenting such views. For instance, the Foreign Minister of Brazil, Mr. de San Thiago Dantas, speaking at the third plenary meeting, said that:

"... studies should be undertaken without delay to determine the minimum degree of on-site inspection that is essential to ensure that the undertakings given are being fulfilled." (ENDC/PV.3. page 9)

This statement was specifically endorsed at the sixth plenary meeting by the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Mr. Yifru, who went on to speak about devising an international scientific system of verification which could "resolve differences in results of national detection systems". (ENDC/PV.6. page 20)

Thus we find that a number of representatives of the eight co-sponsoring delegations have gone on record with the view that on-site inspections are in some degree indispensable. We do not consider it at all likely that ideas of this nature, which were held prior to the preparation of the joint memorandum, would have been suddenly abandoned while it was being worked out. Moreover, as I have said, our reading of the joint memorandum only reinforces our belief that, in the aspect of their proposal dealing with the obligatory or indispensable nature of on-site inspections, the eight co-sponsoring delegations have remained completely consistent.

I should emphasize that our conclusions on this point still leave an enormous amount of room for working out the details of a compromise between the old positions of the Soviet Union and the West, in just the fashion that was clearly intended by the sponsors of the joint memorandum. It is precisely in this area that we are

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urging the Soviet delegation to come forward with reasonable and well-thought-out proposals. For instance, it must be decided just how national stations are to be used; and, indeed, which national stations we are talking about. Nothing has so far been determined about the co-ordination of national stations, or about arrangements for their transmission of recorded data to the central scientific commission.

Even though this is a most important point, we have not heard expressed, so far at least, any ideas about which new stations might be built to supplement existing networks, in order to obtain proper world-wide spacing in seismic and aseismic areas, and about the relation of the spacing of these ground-based controls to high-altitude tests -- that is, to their detection and identification. I say this because paragraph 3 of the joint memorandum merely says that the data reporting system "might be based and built upon already existing national networks", which leaves open the whole problem of precisely what building is to occur.

Similarly, all sorts of possible variations could be worked out regarding the central international organ. My statement at the twelfth meeting of the Sub-Committee enumerated -- as the representative of the United Kingdom has already said -- a great many of the specific items that would have to be covered.

Finally, regarding on-site inspections, and quite apart from the issue of whether they are to be obligatory on the parties in certain circumstances, there are a host of unresolved questions where compromise can be reached, and indeed must be reached, between East and West. Some idea of the variety of these subjects can be obtained by referring to my statement at the eleventh meeting of the Sub-Committee.

What we need now in these negotiations is some evidence that the Soviet Union will be reasonable in fact as well as in words. What the Soviet Union has told us up to now about its version of the eight-nation plan does not, unfortunately, add up to any material change from the past Soviet position of 28 November 1961. Nevertheless, the eight-nation plan can be the springboard to success if honest, sincere and detailed negotiations are undertaken within the framework which it offers. It is for these reasons that we urge our Soviet colleagues to join us in this exploration and to abandon their present refusal to get down to a detailed discussion of the fundamental issues.

I am aware, of course, that this negotiation cannot now, any more than in the past, go on without regard to what is happening outside this Conference concerning

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the actual testing of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has placed itself on record with the statement of Premier Khrushchev of 12 April that it would resume nuclear weapon tests if the United States and the United Kingdom carried out further tests in any environment. So far as we know, this statement by Premier Khrushchev still stands. Since the United States is currently conducting nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean, which were made necessary by the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear tests in September 1961, after a three-year halt in such tests, we must anticipate that the Soviet Union intends to follow through on its statement that it will start yet another round of such tests beyond its series of last autumn. In these circumstances we cannot but be aware of the possibility that the Soviet Union, at this particular moment at least, may not be particularly anxious to carry on successful negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty.

As we have stated many times, my Government deplores the fact that nuclear weapon tests were ever started again last September and that they are still going on. However, I should like to make it clear that the United States is not trying to use these negotiations for a nuclear test ban to gain any advantage over the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary is the case. We are not interested in any manoeuvres to put the Soviet Union in a bad propaganda position on this point. We are interested in only one thing, and that is the conclusion of a sound and effective nuclear test ban treaty under reasonable arrangements that provide for effective measures of control to ensure that the treaty is being scrupulously carried out by all parties.

If the Soviet Union will negotiate with us fairly and come to a sound agreement in short order on mutually satisfactory arrangements for ending all tests in all environments, we are sure that we will not have any difficulty in devising a means for making certain that no nuclear Power has any reason to feel that the treaty itself is putting it at a military disadvantage. Therefore let us put any such considerations aside and get on with the job of exploring the joint memorandum and working out a sound and effective nuclear test ban treaty, under such appropriate international controls as the eight nations have recommended. Only in this way can we make progress towards our goal.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The Committee has again been compelled to take up the question of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests. Discussion of this question at a plenary meeting has become

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necessary because the situation which has arisen in the three-Power nuclear Sub-Committee remains extremely unsatisfactory. The stand which the United States and the United Kingdom representatives are taking on the discontinuance of tests gives rise to grave concern regarding the outcome of further negotiations, and threatens to prevent the attainment of agreement on this question. All the efforts made by the non-aligned States and the Soviet Union to lead the negotiations out of the impasse and reach a mutually-acceptable agreement have met with stubborn resistance from the Western Powers.

Despite continued assertions, which have been repeated again today, of their desire to reach agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the United States and the United Kingdom are in fact working to prevent the conclusion of such an agreement and to keep their hands free to continue the nuclear weapon tests which they have resumed underground, in the atmosphere, under water and at high altitudes. This explains the stand which the United States and United Kingdom representatives have taken in the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the three-Power Sub-Committee.

If one took the words of Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber out of context and did not inquire into the substance of their position, one might get the impression that the Western Powers have decided to renounce their extreme demands, which are clearly unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and to devote themselves to seeking a reasonable compromise. Today they have again tried to give this impression. But the records of the Sub-Committee's recent meetings show that in reality the position of the Western Powers remains basically unchanged on the main points at issue. It continues to give no hope that the future course of our negotiations will be fruitful. The praise the Western representatives have expressed of the non-aligned countries represents a rather clumsy manoeuvre, designed to conceal, behind eulogistic phrases addressed to these countries, the actual inflexibility of the United States and the United Kingdom positions on the main points at issue and their refusal to accept the non-aligned countries' proposals as they stand as an effective basis for an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

In fact, the difference between the positions of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on the discontinuance of tests was and still is briefly as follows. The United States and the United Kingdom demand the establishment on the territory of the Soviet Union of an international network of control posts staffed by foreign

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personnel and directed by an international control organization. The Soviet Union, however, proposes that control over compliance with an agreement should be organized through existing national systems of detection without establishing a network of international control posts.

The United States and the United Kingdom continue to insist on having an international control body with wide powers which could decide at its discretion to carry out on-site investigations -- that is, to dispatch inspection teams. The Soviet Union's proposal, which provides for the implementation of control by means of national detection systems, has so far excluded the establishment of such an international body.

Finally, there is the question of inspection. The United States and the United Kingdom continue to persist in their demand for compulsory inspection, carried out by decision of the international control commission. The Soviet Union's proposal has not provided, as I have just said, either for the establishment of any international control body or for international inspection.

Those are, in brief, the main differences between the position of the Western Powers and that of the Soviet Union.

When the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests were resumed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and in the three-Power Sub-Committee which it set up, they immediately reached an impasse because the United States and the United Kingdom persisted in their attitude on these three main points of disagreement. Then the eight non-aligned States represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, concerned at the situation which has arisen and desiring to find some solution to this problem, submitted their joint memorandum at the 21st meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 16 April. In this memorandum they proposed that both sides -- the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, should come to an agreement on a new basis, on the basis of the proposals set out in their joint memorandum. They propose:

- (1) to organize systematic observation for nuclear explosions on the basis of existing national systems of detection;

- (2) to constitute, for the purpose of processing and analysing data received from national systems of detection, a small international commission consisting of a limited number of highly-qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, whose functions would include, in addition to processing and analysing data, consultations with nuclear Powers on whose territory suspicious events might occur and requests to these countries to furnish additional data;

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(3) on the question of inspection, the non-aligned States point out in their memorandum that countries in whose territory a suspicious event occurred could invite the international commission to visit their territories and/or the sites of the event the nature of which was in doubt.

Those are the three main provisions which the non-aligned States have proposed that the nuclear Powers should accept as a basis for a compromise agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

As you see, these proposals of the non-aligned States do not coincide either with the position of the Western Powers on these questions or with that of the Soviet Union. Consequently they represent a middle course, a compromise between these two positions. The attitude of the nuclear Powers to these proposals of the non-aligned countries is a criterion, a touchstone by which we can easily determine whether one side or the other is really seeking agreement or does not want any agreement except on its own terms.

In this connexion it is significant that on 19 April, three days after the non-aligned States submitted their proposals, the Soviet Government issued an official statement (ENDC/32) describing the proposals of the eight non-aligned States as a serious attempt to lead the negotiations out of the impasse and observing that the submission of these proposals had been prompted by the sincere concern of the non-aligned States in connexion with the situation which has arisen. The statement by the Soviet Government expressed the view that, although not all the propositions in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States are equally clear, nevertheless it represents a constructive contribution, since it takes into account in a realistic manner the existing possibilities for a speedy solution of the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. It stated that the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that the submission by the non-aligned States of their proposals on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests gives rise to new hope for the solution of this question in the interest of all peoples and that the Soviet Government expresses its willingness to study the proposals of the non-aligned States as a basis for further negotiations.

How did the Western Powers respond to the initiative taken by the non-aligned States?

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First and foremost, by resuming nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, at high altitudes and under water, in addition to the underground tests which they have already been conducting for over six months. Where the specific proposals by the non-aligned States are concerned, neither the United States Government nor the United Kingdom Government has officially announced its acceptance of these proposals as a basis for negotiations with a view to reaching agreement.

All members of the Committee will recall that, at the meeting of 19 April and at subsequent meetings, the United States and the United Kingdom representatives avoided giving direct answers to this simple question or made their answer conditional upon acceptance of preliminary conditions regarding the interpretation of the actual proposals of the non-aligned countries.

It is also significant that in the joint statement issued on 29 April by Mr. Kennedy, the President of the United States, and Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, after the meeting in Washington at which this question was specifically discussed, the proposals of the eight non-aligned States were passed over in complete silence. This silence is more eloquent than any words. It shows that the United States and the United Kingdom do not want to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union on the discontinuance of tests on the compromise basis proposed by the non-aligned States. Furthermore, in their joint statement the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom give a distorted picture of the negotiations. In this statement they express regret that the Soviet Government has, as they say, not been willing to join in any effective treaty which would end nuclear tests, although not only the Soviet Union but also the eight non-aligned States consider that a treaty drawn up on the basis of the proposals submitted by these States would be a fully effective treaty. This sentence in the joint statement shows that they are clinging to their old positions, which they are always trying to represent in their statements as making for an effective treaty -- in other words, for a treaty providing for international control and compulsory inspection as envisaged in their draft treaty of 18 April 1961. But this sentence also confirms once again that the United States and the United Kingdom do not want to achieve agreement on the compromise basis proposed by the non-aligned States in their memorandum of 16 April and accepted by the Soviet Union.

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The entire world deplores this position of the United States and the United Kingdom, which have ignored the appeal the non-aligned States have made to the nuclear Powers not to go back to their old positions but to come to terms on the basis of the compromise proposal of the non-aligned countries.

In this connexion, I think that what Sir Michael Wright, the United Kingdom representative, said today, and what Mr. Godber said during the discussion of this question in the three-Power Sub-Committee about the United States and the United Kingdom proposals of 18 April being compromise proposals, can only cause general astonishment. If the non-aligned States had regarded the proposals of 18 April as compromise proposals, would there have been any point in their submitting their own proposals which you yourself now regard as compromise proposals?

Nevertheless, the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the three-Power Sub-Committee still continue to assert that the proposals of 18 April are compromise proposals. That is why they are now trying to steer the negotiations on to this basis, which they regard as a compromise basis. But it is clear to everyone that on this basis, which is certainly not a compromise basis but is an extreme position of the United States and the United Kingdom, there can be no agreement. Therefore any attempt to settle controversial issues on the basis of the position of 18 April is completely futile; it is an entirely unrealistic and, I would say, harmful approach. I think that all of us here are very well aware that the non-aligned States did not appeal for a settlement of the outstanding issue on this basis. The stubbornness with which the United States and the United Kingdom are upholding their position of 18 April, which they maintain is a compromise position, shows that they do not in fact want to achieve agreement.

As you see, the truth about the negotiations is that they turn on the position of the Western Powers. Only the United States and the United Kingdom can lead the negotiations out of the impasse. All they have to do for this purpose is to accept the compromise proposals of the eight non-aligned States as they stand, and then the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests can swiftly end in agreement.

When the proposals of the non-aligned States are compared with the position of the United States on the one hand and with that of the Soviet Union on the other, it is quite evident that they are compromise proposals.

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The Soviet proposals of 28 November 1961 did not provide for any kind of international organ or for any inspection; but the Soviet Union, by accepting the proposals of the non-aligned States as a basis, has now moved to a new position and agrees to the setting up of an international commission and also to the suggestion made in the memorandum of the non-aligned States that the parties to the treaty could invite the International Commission to visit their territories or the site where a doubtful event had taken place.

Therefore, the talk we heard today about the Soviet Union upholding its extreme position, as expressed in the proposals of 28 November, is completely at variance with the facts. We have taken up a new position, and we propose that an agreement should be drawn up on the basis of this new compromise position proposed by the eight non-aligned States. What alternative are the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom offering to these reasonable and realistic proposals of the non-aligned States? They are continuing to insist on a system of international as opposed to national control, and on their old unacceptable demand for compulsory on-site inspection. They did this again today.

Thus, for instance, Mr. Dean said at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on 24 April that, in order to ensure observance of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, it was necessary to accept the principle of "effective detection through an international network of control posts ..." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.10, page 13). But the memorandum of the non-aligned States says nothing about an international control network. Yet you are demanding this.

Mr. Godber also said at the same meeting on 24 April that it seemed to him that the proposals by the eight non-aligned States "... do accept the principle of an international network of detection posts ..." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.10, page 3).

Mr. Dean, clearly distorting the substance of the memorandum of the non-aligned States, said at the last meeting of the Sub-Committee on 3 May that, in his view, this document "envisages inspections on an obligatory basis" (ENDC/SC.1/PV.12, page 7). In the same statement Mr. Dean emphasized that it was particularly important that decisions by the International Commission to undertake on-site inspections should "... be obligatory on the parties in certain circumstances" (ENDC/SC.1/PV.12, page 9).

Commenting on the proposal of the non-aligned States concerning the procedure for conducting on-site inspection, Mr. Dean said at the 11th meeting of the Sub-Committee on 26 April that it would "make no sense" if on-site inspections

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were conducted" ... only in invitation of the Power whose territory is to be inspected and on whose territory the unidentified event occurred"

(ENDC/SC.1/PV.11, page 5).

But, Mr. Dean, you cannot quote a single phrase, a single word from the eight-nation memorandum which indicates that inspection is to be obligatory. You cannot do so. And now you are attempting today to strengthen your case by quoting particular statements by individual representatives of the countries sponsoring this memorandum. But is this really a sound approach?

You quote observations which were made by the representatives of Burma and Brazil at the very beginning of the discussion of this question and which represented their preliminary views and opinions on how the controversial issues might be settled. We make many statements expressing ideas of one kind and another, but when we draft a document we work out a definitive formulation of our position and record it in precise terms in the document. This is the purpose of any document submitted for consideration.

Why then are you now quoting observations by individual members - observations which, incidentally, you also interpret in a particular way? If I were to study what Mr. Barrington and Mr. Dantas have said, I could quote a number of other observations which would tell against you. So that, here again, it is a matter of interpreting individual observations. But to take opinions expressed before the document was submitted to us is to proceed from an entirely false premise, because the real point of view of Mr. Barrington, Mr. Dantas and others is represented by the contents of the document. It is the point of view embodied in the document, and not the point of view expressed by various representatives in a preliminary discussion of this matter.

Therefore any attempt at the present time to interpret this document, not as it stands, but in accordance with the observations which you and other individual members of this group of States have expressed on the subject is an entirely wrong approach. It is a tendentious approach.

We do not interpret this document, but urge that it should be taken as it stands. Take, for instance, paragraphs 4 and 5, as drafted. You could not find in these two paragraphs, which you have quoted to us today, anything suggesting that inspection is obligatory. You could not find anything, although you attempted to interpret paragraph 5 as qualifying paragraph 4 in some way.

Paragraph 5 does, however, contain a reference to paragraph 4, and this reference is quite definite:

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"The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment". (ENDC/28, page 2).

But paragraph 4 states:

"Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt" (ibid).

The words are: "could invite the Commission". Why then do you now tell us that this document provides for compulsory inspection? It does nothing of the sort. It makes no such provision. It is your interpretation, your wishful thinking. You are taking the wish for the reality.

But this means that, as everyone is very well aware, the adoption of such a position by the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of on-site international inspection has already led the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests into a hopeless impasse. To adhere now to that old and patently discredited position is to continue to block the way to the achievement of a mutually-acceptable agreement on the discontinuance of tests opened up by the proposals of the eight non-aligned States.

While in fact rejecting the principal compromise proposals in the memorandum of the non-aligned States and attempting to divert the discussion into the channel of discussing old and unacceptable positions. The United States and United Kingdom representatives have made statements about the desirability and usefulness of discussing a whole series of secondary questions and points of detail. Thus, for instance, at meetings of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber have proposed to the Soviet representative that such questions as the composition of the international commission, its detailed powers and functions, its financing, etc. should be the subject of detailed discussion. It must, however, be obvious to everyone that it would be quite pointless to discuss these particular issues at the present time when the Western Powers refuse to accept the basic principles set out in the memorandum of the non-aligned States. Such negotiations would merely serve as a convenient screen for the negative position of the Western Powers, which are declining to come to an agreement on the basis of the compromise proposals of the non-aligned States and are adhering to their position of 18 April, which they claim is a compromise position.

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Essentially the same purpose is served by the proposal made by the Italian delegation on 25 April (ENDC/PV.27, page 37) that a group of scientific experts should be appointed to discuss the technical aspects of preparing an agreement on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum. The Soviet delegation considers that, so far from being conducive to the success of our negotiations, the adoption of such a proposal would, on the contrary, mean that they would become bogged down in endless technical and detailed discussions which would undoubtedly lead to their breakdown.

As is clear from the analysis I have just given of our talks on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, the Western Powers - the United States and the United Kingdom - continue to cling stubbornly to their old position and refuse, in fact, to accept the compromise proposals of the eight non-aligned States. As a result, the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests remain deadlocked. In the circumstances it may well be asked what purpose negotiations can serve so long as the Western Powers stand by their old position and continue to insist on their conditions of international control and obligatory inspection, though well aware that no agreement can be reached on that basis. Is it not clear that, in carrying on the negotiations in this way, the Western Powers are merely trying to use them as a screen for the continuation of their nuclear weapon tests and for their intensification of the arms race and of all the military preparations that are taking place on an ever-increasing scale in the NATO countries - as is evident from the May session of this military bloc? In view of this, should we not all call upon the Western Powers to stop playing at negotiations and take up a clear and realistic position in order to get the negotiations out of the impasse? We believe that we should.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have listened with the closest attention to the important and detailed statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, and I have read with great care the verbatim records of the recent meetings of the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

I cannot conceal my deep regret that the Sub-Committee's examination of the eight-nation joint memorandum does not appear to have improved the prospects of an early agreement. I think the spirit in which the Italian delegation received that memorandum is already known. We accepted it with satisfaction and gratitude

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as a very valuable contribution to the work of the Conference -- an active contribution prompted by that sincere desire for agreement which we fully share.

Allow me to remind you that at the meeting on 19 April the Italian delegation requested that, in view of its importance, the memorandum should be referred immediately to the three-Power Sub-Committee for study (ENDC/PV.24, page 23). We are glad that this was done, even though the study has not yet yielded satisfactory results.

We are aware that this memorandum is not easy to interpret, especially as, for reasons which we recognize and respect as well founded, the eight co-authors do not at present wish to clarify their common position. I myself have tried to interpret it, but I admit that I met with difficulties.

My attention was drawn particularly to the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the memorandum, which states that "... the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt." It seemed to me that those words authorized all parties to the treaty which might record doubtful technical data by their national means of detection, to apply to the international commission with a view to its inspecting the territory of the country to which those data related. In other words, I thought that if the national control system of country A recorded doubtful events coming from the territory of country B, country A would have the right to apply to the International Commission with a view to its requesting country B to be allowed to inspect the territory of that country. In that case, refusal of inspection would, of course, be a fairly clear indication of violation.

In this connexion, I asked several delegations among the eight -- I will not say which, of course, because these exchanges of views were entirely confidential and friendly, and I should not like to give the least impression that I do not respect the wish expressed by the representative of Ethiopia on behalf of the eight nations at the twenty-fourth meeting -- whether my interpretation was correct, and I received different answers. Some delegations told me that my interpretation was correct; others said it was not.

So you see the difficulties with which we are faced. Of course, all these questions of interpretation would be completely pointless if one of the three nuclear Powers gave us to understand, here and now, that on principle it would always refuse to permit an inspection which the International Commission asked permission to make.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Be that as it may, you are aware that at the twenty-seventh meeting my delegation proposed the immediate appointment of a study group consisting of scientists of the three nuclear Powers and of the eight countries which were the co-authors of the memorandum (ENDC/PV.27. page 37). We put forward that proposal for three reasons: first, because the memorandum itself states, in paragraph 3, that there are possibilities of "establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific basis"; secondly, because the representative of Ethiopia, speaking on behalf of the eight delegations, said at the twenty-fourth meeting:

"We shall willingly and gladly be of any service that we can in this regard.

We should also be prepared to make scientific collaboration available to the best of our ability" (ENDC/PV.24, page 6).

and thirdly, because the memorandum itself suggests constituting a group of highly-qualified scientists to serve on the international commission. Since it is those scientists who are later to safeguard us against any possibility of clandestine tests, it seems to me perfectly natural that such a group should be set up now, to study and formulate procedures for applying the system.

I do not think the terms of reference of this technical committee are a very complicated problem. The committee's terms of reference would be laid down by the memorandum and by means of a questionnaire which could be drawn up with the assistance of all Delegations. Several questions have in fact already been raised in regard to the memorandum which the eight delegations do not wish to answer. But in my opinion their scientists could certainly give completely impartial answers, using the objective language of science which is common to all scientists throughout the world.

At the twenty-seventh meeting Mr. Zorin said he intended to study my proposal with the other co-Chairman, but wished to hear the views of the eight delegations concerned before doing so. The Soviet representative said:

"I think that if the co-Chairmen are to be able to discuss this question they must obviously know how it is viewed by the representatives of the eight States. As nothing has been said on the subject ..."

(ENDC/PV.27, page 51).

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Today it seems to me -- and I note this with regret -- that Mr. Zorin has hastily rejected my proposal and even considers it dangerous, although the eight delegations have not yet given an opinion on it. For my part I believe, on the contrary, that at this stage, especially in view of the difficulties the Subcommittee is continuing to encounter, it would be very desirable to consider the possibility of getting out of the deadlock by making a further effort on the basis of the proposal I have taken the liberty of submitting to the Conference.

I wish to assure you once again that this proposal was made in order to stress the great importance and seriousness of the eight delegations' proposal, so that it may be studied as thoroughly and effectively as possible, in the hope that it may lead us to a concrete agreement that will save humanity once and for all from the dangers of nuclear tests. Of course, if the eight delegations did not consider it useful to set up the committee I have referred to, I should not press my proposal. It is for these eight delegations and, obviously the three nuclear Powers to decide.

Mr. LAUL (India): I am sure we would all wish to study very carefully the statements which have been made today on this important matter. I think many delegations here would appreciate it if the co-Chairmen could let us return to this matter, perhaps tomorrow morning or, at the latest, the day after tomorrow, so as to give us an opportunity of studying the records and then seeing whether we can offer comments which might be useful for the progress of negotiations regarding the cessation of nuclear tests.

We are all, I am sure, more convinced than ever that there should be no divergence from that objective of the cessation of nuclear tests. We feel that a little more time for consideration of the statements which have been made today would be necessary to enable us to comment usefully. I make this suggestion to the co-Chairmen and hope that they will be able to accommodate us.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): The two co-Chairmen had already agreed that tomorrow's meeting should be devoted to general and complete disarmament. Subject to the approval of my co-Chairman, we might devote the meeting on Thursday morning to nuclear testing. Is that agreeable?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):
I would prefer Wednesday.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): If there is no objection, there will be a meeting tomorrow on general and complete disarmament, and a meeting on Wednesday on nuclear testing.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I assume that if the entire time of the meeting on Wednesday is not taken up with the subject of nuclear testing, we can discuss general and complete disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-second meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. A. H. Dean, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 8 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

